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Knowing Disability, Differently1 
 
Knowing the apparatus of disability, conceptually 
 
Rare exceptions notwithstanding, the apparatus (dispositif) of disability continues to be left 
out of feminist and other critical philosophical analyses produced across the sub-disciplines of 
ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of language, aesthetics, political philosophy, cognitive science, 
and epistemology (Tremain 2013a). Even feminist epistemologists and other philosophers who use 
the relatively recent and philosophically and politically important notions of epistemic injustice 
and epistemological ignorance do not consider how the apparatus of disability conditions their 
examination of phenomena, that is, do not consider how disability conditions what they examine, 
how they examine what they examine, nor why they examine what they examine. The failure of 
feminist and other philosophers to incorporate insights and arguments from philosophy of 
disability and disability studies into their work on epistemic injustice and epistemological 
ignorance is starkly evident in the abundance of ableist metaphors—such as “epistemic blindness,” 
“epistemic deafness,” “meta-blindness,” “gender-blind,” and “silenced”—that they invoke to 
bolster their claims, an abundance that attests to their lack of familiarity with or disregard for the 
arguments that feminist and other philosophers and theorists of disability have articulated in 
opposition to the use of these metaphors (for instance, see, Tremain 2011a; Tremain 2011b; Schalk 
2013). In other words, discussions of epistemological ignorance themselves seem to (re)produce a 
form of epistemological ignorance. Indeed, perhaps the time has come to scrutinize the 
metaphorical role that the concept of ignorance itself plays in feminist and other critical philosophy 
and epistemology. Is the concept of epistemological ignorance itself a paradoxical and self-
contradicting ableist metaphor? Do feminist and other philosophers inadvertently contribute to the 
harms perpetrated against certain group of disabled people when they invoke the concept of 
epistemological ignorance in their work?  
The hypothesis that the concept of epistemological ignorance itself is an ableist metaphor 
suggests a number of ambitious avenues of inquiry to pursue in (feminist) philosophy and 
epistemology of disability. I set aside this hypothesis in what follows, however, in order to 
substantiate my earlier claims that feminist and other philosophers have consistently failed to 
incorporate critical understanding of the apparatus of disability into their philosophical analyses. I 
want to show that the failure of philosophers to attend to both (the apparatus of) disability and 
theoretical insights advanced about it comprises a form of epistemic injustice that distorts the ways 
in which discussions about (among other things) identity, oppression, and privilege are framed 
within the philosophical literature on epistemic injustice, as well as how the concept of epistemic 
injustice itself is construed within that body of work.  
In order to make my case, I first examine Miranda Fricker’s discussion of the conditions 
that must prevail for a form of epistemic disadvantage to constitute epistemic injustice, that is, the 
necessary conditions for a form of hermeneutical disadvantage to count as hermeneutical injustice. 
I show that insofar as Fricker does not account for the apparatus of disability and its political 
character in the distinction that she draws between hermeneutical disadvantages that result from 
injustice and hermeneutical disadvantages that result from “bad luck,” the motivation for the 
distinction is unjustified and the distinction itself remains unsubstantiated. Once I have shown that 
Fricker does not appropriately account for the apparatus of disability in her discussion of 





hermeneutical injustice, I turn to consider how disability has been left out of analyses of a now 
widely-used example of testimonial injustice that she introduced, namely, the trial of Tom 
Robinson in Harper Lee’s 1960 novel To Kill a Mockingbird. I focus in particular on claims that 
Fricker and José Medina advance about the ways in which the character of Robinson is racialized, 
gendered, and sexualized in the novel’s narrative. I am concerned to show that a more complex 
interpretation of the identities and events that unfold in Lee’s novel than these philosophers 
articulate would consider how the apparatus of disability contributes to the shape of the ways that 
Robinson is racialized, gendered, and sexualized in that drama, as well as to the ways that he is 
disabled therein. My identification of disability as an “apparatus” follows Michel Foucault who 
introduced the term apparatus to refer to a heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, and 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions that respond to an urgent need in a given 
historical moment (Foucault 1980: 194; Tremain 2015: 8). Foucault’s innovative idea of apparatus 
enables me to move away from dominant understandings of disability that variously construe it as 
a personal characteristic or attribute, a property of given individuals, an identity, or a form of social 
oppression. Furthermore, the idea of an apparatus enables an understanding of disability that is 
culturally relative, historicist, and more comprehensive than are the aforementioned 
understandings of it. As we shall see, in some respects, the conception of a disability apparatus 
resembles the notion of “social imaginary” (Medina 2011: 15, 24) that Medina employs in his 
writing on epistemic injustice.  
 
 
Knowing (the apparatus of) disability, politically  
In Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing (2007), she argues that 
the capacity of relatively powerless social groups to adequately and appropriately understand the 
world is jeopardized if dominant groups disproportionately influence the interpretive resources 
available at any given time. Fricker thinks that dominant groups should been seen to inflict a form 
of epistemic injustice when they enjoy such unfair hermeneutical advantages. Thus, she refers to 
this form of unfair hermeneutical advantage as “hermeneutical injustice” (Fricker 2007: 146-48). 
Asymmetrical relations of social power, she explains, can skew shared hermeneutical resources in 
ways that both enable members of powerful social groups to understand their social experiences 
and prevent members of relatively disempowered social groups from understanding their own 
experiences. The mid-twentieth-century feminist consciousness-raising groups, in which women 
publicly articulated and exchanged experiences that had previously been systematically obscured 
and routinely privatized were, she remarks, a direct response to the fact that such epistemological 
resources had hitherto been rendered unavailable to women. Within these groups, she notes, 
women collectively realized resources for meaning and understanding that had previously been 
only implicit in the social interpretive practices of that historical context (Fricker 2007: 148). In 
order to illustrate these claims, Fricker quotes an excerpt from Susan Brownmiller’s memoir in 
which Brownmiller (1990: 182) wrote about one woman’s revelatory introduction to feminist 
consciousness-raising in a group that embarked on a discussion about postpartum depression. In 
the quoted passage, Brownmiller described how, over the course of the forty-five minute 
discussion, this woman came to realize that the depression that she had experienced—and for 
which both she and her husband had blamed her—was not a “personal deficiency” at all, but rather 
“a combination of physiological things and a real societal thing, isolation” (Brownmiller 1990: 





182, in Fricker 2007: 149). As Fricker explains it, the lack of understanding with which the woman 
had lived up until that life-altering discussion constituted a harm inflicted upon her in her capacity 
as a knower, that is, constituted a specific sort of epistemic injustice, namely, a hermeneutical 
injustice. 
Fricker is concerned to point out that not all hermeneutical disadvantages constitute 
hermeneutical injustice. Thus, she aims to identify the features that distinguish hermeneutical 
disadvantages that inflict epistemic injustice from hermeneutical disadvantages that do not involve 
injustice. Drawing upon the distinction between justice and luck that is a mainstay of mid-
twentieth-century analytic political philosophy and ethics, she remarks that some hermeneutical 
disadvantages derive from “bad luck,” rather than from injustice, a difference that she asserts can 
be easily recognized (Fricker 2007: 149, 152). In order to illustrate this distinction, she offers the 
following description as an example of a hermeneutical disadvantage that does not inflict epistemic 
injustice:  
 
If, for instance, someone has a medical condition affecting their social behaviour at a 
historical moment at which that condition is still misunderstood and largely 
undiagnosed, then they may suffer from a hermeneutical disadvantage that is, while 
collective, especially damaging to them in particular. They are unable to render their 
experiences intelligible by reference to the idea that they have a disorder, and so they 
are personally in the dark, and may also suffer seriously negative consequences from 
others’ non-comprehension of their condition. But they are not subject to 
hermeneutical injustice; rather, theirs is a poignant case of circumstantial bad luck. 
 
What, to me, is striking about Fricker’s sketch of a hermeneutical disadvantage that derives from 
circumstantial bad luck, rather than from injustice, is how aptly it describes the hermeneutical 
disadvantage that only three pages earlier in her book she had associated with a paradigm case of 
epistemic injustice, that is, the lack of hermeneutical resources that in the not-so-distant past had 
been unavailable to women who experienced postpartum depression. Fricker argues, however, that 
the salient difference with respect to epistemic injustice between the situation of women with 
postpartum depression and the situation of the hypothetical subject in the cited example is that in 
the former case, but not the latter, “background social conditions” prevailed “that were conducive 
to the relevant hermeneutical lacuna” (Fricker: 152). She explains that revelations about postpartum 
depression emerged in feminist consciousness-raising groups during a historical moment in which 
women were still markedly powerless in relation to men. This powerlessness, Fricker points out, 
entailed that women had unequal hermeneutical participation, which “sort of inequality provides 
the crucial background conditions for hermeneutical injustice” (Fricker: 152). She notes, 
furthermore, that when this kind of unequal hermeneutical participation exists with respect to some 
area of social experience, members of the relevant disadvantaged group are likely “hermeneutically 
marginalized” (153). 
My argument (contra Fricker) is that people with an “undiagnosed condition” whose social 
behavior is subject to “negative consequences” due to the ways in which others perceive them are 
also members of a hermeneutically marginalized group; that is, the detrimental consequences that 
accrue to these people are produced by precisely the sort of background conditions from which 
Fricker claims that a hermeneutical disadvantage must result in order to qualify as a form of 
hermeneutical injustice. Certain forms of unequal social power—that is, mechanisms of the 
disability apparatus—produce an array of disciplinary norms about proper social behavior and 





interaction, modes of communication, rationality, emotional self-control, psychological resilience, 
and so on. These historically-specific forms of unequal power—that is, these “background 
conditions”—shape the public perceptions and authoritative epistemologies from which the 
negative social, political, interpersonal, and economic consequences of the sort to which Fricker 
refers accrue to some people, naturalizing, medicalizing, and depoliticizing these perceptions and 
epistemologies in ways that conceal their contingent and artefactual character.2 The medical and 
juridical classifications that emerge from these background conditions actually produce the kinds 
of subjects that they are claimed to (merely) identify and name or represent. As Foucault pointed 
out, people are not naturally—that is, universally and transhistorically—sorted into kinds in 
accordance with ontologically pre-existing categories such as sane and mad, healthy and sick, 
normal and pathological. Rather, kinds of people come into being because we make them that way, 
by and through the practices that we use to describe them and in which they are inserted. Ian 
Hacking has noted, furthermore, that the practices constitutive of the subject have “looping effects” 
(Hacking 1995, 351–383): people become aware of how they are perceived and classified, and this 
in turn changes their self-perceptions and self-understandings. Because the self-perceptions and 
self-understandings of people subjected to disciplinary classification change by virtue of that 
subjection, changes to the classifications themselves generally follow. In other words, as more and 
more people come to identify with a particular normalizing classification, they struggle to exert 
greater control over its usage and associated meanings. 
Nevertheless, the performative and artefactual character of human classifications in general 
and psychiatric diagnoses in particular does not nullify their disciplinary and punitive effects. As 
philosophers and theorists of disability have repeatedly shown, people who, for any number of 
reasons, do not conform to highly-regulated standards of (for instance) social behavior and 
interaction—such as people who are classified as “mentally ill” or are perceived to be “insane”—
are routinely discredited, ignored, vilified, and stigmatized. Until the relatively recent formation 
and rise of “the mad movement” and related social movements, the hermeneutical resources that 
such disabled people required in order to collectively understand the political character of their 
situation were unavailable to them. In short, these people have been, and indeed continue to be, 
habitually subjected to hermeneutical injustice. That Fricker, in her discussion of kinds of 
hermeneutical disadvantage, neither takes into account the arguments that philosophers and 
theorists of disability and disabled activists have articulated with respect to the political origins of 
the “negative consequences” that accrue to these disabled people, nor recognizes the unequal 
hermeneutical participation that produces these effects, seems itself to be an instance of the form 
of epistemic injustice that Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I turn now to more closely consider 
testimonial injustice in the following sections of this essay. 
 
 
Knowing Tom Robinson, differently 
 
In her book, Fricker offers the trial of Robinson in Lee’s novel as an “extreme example” 
(Fricker 2007: 26) of the kind of testimonial injustice that she aims to portray philosophically in 
the book. As she defines it, “a speaker sustains a testimonial injustice if and only if she receives a 
credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice in the hearer” (Fricker 2007: 28). Fricker wants to 
show that the events and outcome of the fictional 1935 trial of Robinson exemplify such credibility 
deficit due to racist prejudice. Fricker concentrates on one moment in Lee’s depiction of 
Robinson’s testimony to explicate her claims according to which, given particular social contexts 





and circumstances, some people will invariably be regarded as less credible due to the identity 
prejudice against them that certain other people hold: the exchange between Robinson and the 
county prosecutor, Mr. Gilmer, about why Robinson ran out of and away from the Ewell house 
and why he was in the house in the first place. Fricker asserts that Lee’s depiction of this moment 
in the trial of Robinson vividly illustrates how testimonial injustices contribute to the production 
and reproduction of positions of social subordination and oppression (Fricker 2007: 23-29). 
Medina, who acknowledges the insightful character of Fricker’s arguments, has pointed 
out nevertheless that, contra Fricker, “a proportional, contextualized account” (Medina 2011: 15, 
22-28) of epistemic injustice must also attend to the ways in which the credibility deficits that 
accrue to members of certain social groups due to identity prejudice are inextricably tied to 
correlative credibility excesses that accrue to members of other social groups due to their identity 
privilege (Medina 2011: 23, and passim). Thus, Medina asserts that, in order to fully capture and 
adequately understand these sorts of credibility differentials, we must go beyond Fricker’s almost-
exclusive focus on the utterances of individual speakers to also consider the antecedent social 
imaginary in terms of which such utterances are produced, including the historical and extant 
discursive, cultural, political, and economic mechanisms and events that make the disparate 
interpretations and receptions of the utterances possible. In the context of Robinson’s trial, 
philosophical inquiry into epistemic injustice that incorporates analysis of how the social 
imaginary (to use Medina’s term) contributes to the production of utterances and the degree of 
credibility variously attributed to them would consider (for example) how the deeply-seated racist 
belief according to which all black men are potential rapists who have an uncontrollable desire for 
white women had already set in place the disparate credibility attributions that determined the 
inevitable outcome of the trial. As Medina explains it, a proportional, contextualized account of 
the epistemic injustice that shapes the proceedings and outcome of  Robinson’s trial would take 
into account the credibility excesses conferred upon Ewell and her father, Bob Ewell—whose 
accusations initially led to the charges against Robinson—and the credibility excesses conferred 
upon both of the white attorneys involved in the trial, as well as the antecedent white supremacist 
social imaginary that (among other things) conditioned the perceptions and beliefs of the all-white 
male jury and white spectators in the courtroom even before the trial began. Medina thinks that 
this kind of proportional, contextualized account of epistemic injustice enables nuanced 
understanding of the ways in which shifting gradations of credibility attribution contribute to, 
collude with, and consolidate social and economic hierarchies.   
Although Fricker and Medina may disagree about whether the utterances made in this 
moment of the fictional trial should be the central element in a philosophical analysis of how 
epistemic injustice is represented in Lee’s narrative, their analyses of this moment advance our 
understanding of how credibility attributions underwrite the constitution of race, gender, and 
sexuality, as well as, alternatively, how the complicated relations between these social categories 
influence the differential distribution of credibility attributions. Nevertheless, I want to argue that 
the analyses of these phenomena that Fricker and Medina have produced remain incomplete 
insofar as neither philosopher makes more than a passing reference to the fact that Lee’s character 
Tom Robinson is disabled. That Robinson is disabled seems to play no role, for Fricker or Medina, 
in the formation of identity categories within the narrative, nor, for them, does (the apparatus of) 
disability play a role in the events of the narrative, except to the extent that, and insofar as, 
Robinson’s arm and hand provide tangible evidence that he could not have committed the crime 
of which he was accused. Nor, furthermore, do there seem to be insights about disability that we 
can derive from the novel. For Fricker and Medina, that is, Robinson’s social positioning as 





disabled is essentially no more than the rhetorical device that Lee uses to underscore the credibility 
deficit attributed to him when the guilty verdict is eventually pronounced.  
I maintain that the analyses that Fricker and Medina offer with respect to the Robinson trial 
in To Kill a Mockingbird would have been more satisfactory had both philosophers incorporated 
insights from philosophy of disability into their claims about how gender, race, and sexuality and 
the credibility differentials incumbent upon these categories are represented through the events 
and outcome of the trial. An improved analysis of how social identity categories are produced in 
the narrative—that is, a more complex intersectional analysis than these philosophers offer—
would consider: (1) how the constitution of elements of the apparatus of disability is inextricably 
interwoven with the constitution of social identities that other apparatuses of power produce and 
thus contributes to their constitution; (2) how the apparatus of disability is constituted by and 
through these other identities categories; and, in addition (3) how credibility assessments are 
conferred and withheld on the basis of the proximity of these identity categories to a conception 
of normality and hence contribute to the mechanism of normalization that the apparatus of 
disability produces. In order to indicate some of the insights about the apparatus of disability that 
would have been derived from such an expanded analysis, let me turn to consider the exchange 
between Robinson and Gilmer that pertains to why Robinson was on the Ewell property and went 
into their house. A portion of their exchange is especially relevant to my argument that Fricker and 
Medina overlook the precise nature of the way in which Robinson is racialized insofar as they fail 
to recognize the importance of disability to this exchange (and to the book’s narrative in general). 
This portion of the exchange immediately follows Robinson’s testimony that he entered the Ewell 
property in order to help Mayella Ewell with her chores: 
  
Mr. Gilmer: “You’re a mighty good fellow, it seems—did all this for not one penny?” 
Tom Robinson: “Yes, suh. I felt sorry for her, she seemed to try more ’n the rest of ‘em“ 
Mr. Gilmer: “You felt sorry for her, you felt sorry for her?” 
Mr. Gilmer seemed ready to rise to the ceiling. 
The witness realized his mistake and shifted uncomfortably in the chair. But the damage 
had been done. Below us, nobody liked Tom Robinson’s answer. Mr. Gilmer paused a long 
time to let it sink in. (Lee 1960: 263-64) 
 
Fricker writes that this portion of the exchange effectively destroys any epistemic trust that 
members of the white jury may have allowed themselves to feel for their fellow human being, the 
black man testifying, Robinson. “For feeling sorry for someone,” Fricker remarks, “is a taboo 
sentiment if you are black and the object of your sympathy is a white person.” (Fricker 2007: 24, 
emphasis in Fricker) Within the context of a white supremacist ideology, Fricker explains, “the 
fundamental ethical sentiment of plain human sympathy becomes disfigured in the eyes of whites 
so that it appears as little more than an indicator of self-perceived advantage on the part of the 
black subject.” (Fricker 2007: 24) Within the context of white supremacy, she notes, no black man 
is permitted to have feelings that imply an advantage, of any sort, relative to a white person, 
regardless of how difficult and desolate that white person’s life is. Agreeing with Fricker, Medina 
remarks that this moment of the trial throws into relief “[t]he comparative and contrastive nature 
of credibility assignments” (Medina 2011: 21) of the defendant (Robinson), on the one hand, and 
his interrogator (Gilmer), on the other. As Medina puts it, Robinson’s credibility “diminishes to 
the point of disappearance” (Medina 2011: 23) when his claim about “pity” meets with the 
mocking disbelief of a far more credible white man, whose powerful and authoritative echo of the 





white social imaginary renders the plausibility of Robinson’s claim “almost unimaginable” 
(Medina 2011: 24) to the white jurors and spectators in the courtroom. In short, the trial is a zero-
sum contest that pits trust in the word of a black man against trust in the word of a white woman, 
where the former sort of trust amounts to a psychological impossibility. The sense of superiority 
that Gilmer, the all-white jury, and the white spectators in the courtroom perceive to be at the root 
of Robinson’s expression of sympathy for Mayella Ewell serves to underscore that impossibility 
(Fricker 2007: 25).  
Notice how Fricker and Medina respectively describe why Robinson’s explanation for his 
presence on the Ewell property meets with disdain from the white jurors and courtroom spectators. 
Fricker attributes their complete distrust and contempt for Robinson to the fact that he expressed 
“sympathy” for Mayella Ewell. In Medina’s terms, Fricker’s reference to this sympathy becomes 
“pity,” which is often associated with sympathy, but is not equivalent to it. In any case, both Fricker 
and Medina recognize that Robinson, as a black man, is not permitted to be an agent of sympathy 
or pity for a white woman. He is rather, for whites, the personification of a (to use Fricker’s 
unfortunate term) “disfigured” sympathy (pity).  
I want to argue, however, that Fricker and Medina fail to recognize that Robinson, as a 
black man within the context of white supremacy, also is not entitled to be an object of sympathy 
or pity. That he cannot be an object of pity or sympathy, within white supremacy, subjects 
Robinson as a distinctly black disabled person, that is, distinguishes him as a black disabled person 
from white disabled people. If Robinson were a white disabled person and expressed sympathy or 
pity for Mayella Ewell, a nondisabled white woman, Gilmer’s surprise and amazement would have 
conveyed an entirely different meaning. Due to pervasive ableist prejudices and biases, white 
disabled people are widely perceived to deserve pity or sympathy by virtue of their very existence, 
that is, their disabled existence is taken to warrant pity or sympathy, they are perceived as the 
archetypal objects of pity and even tragedy (see Shapiro 1994; Stramondo 2010). By contrast, 
black disabled people are not readily identified as the recipients of such sympathy and pity. Had 
Robinson been a white disabled man who expressed sympathy or pity for a nondisabled white 
woman, his expression of sympathy or pity likely would have met with exaggerated patience, 
patronizing condescension, or even amusement. Because Robinson is a black disabled man, he 
instead confronts contempt when he expresses such sentiments for a white woman. In other words, 
that Robinson cannot himself be an object of pity or even sympathy racializes him with respect to 
disability. Within the racist terms of the disability apparatus, ableist pity (or sympathy) can be 
directed only at white disabled people. Insofar as, in the terms of white supremacist ableism, 
disabled people are the archetypal objects of pity and, given that black men cannot be the objects 
of pity, a black disabled man is, as Tommy Curry has argued, “a conceptual impossibility” (Curry 
2015). “The disabled Black male,” Curry remarks, “is configured as a deformity at some distance 
from the racist stereotype of the Black male savage and, therefore, is unimaginable to most people” 
(Ibid.). Although within the system of white supremacy, white disabled people are generally 
regarded as helpless, genderless, and devoid of sexuality, black men are perceived as superhuman 
and hyper-masculine, are hyper-sexualized as rapists, and construed as black “bucks,” a term that 
in fact prosecutor Gilmer uses to describe Robinson during his interrogation of him (see Lee 1960: 
265). In short, vulnerability, pity, sympathy, and asexuality are “compliments” that white 
supremacy pays to white (disabled) people only.  
The process through which Lee’s narrator Scout (Finch), Scout’s older brother Jem (Finch), 
and Mr. Underwood become aware of the white racist social imaginary that convicted Robinson 
coincides with a distinctive acknowledgement by each of them that Robinson is a disabled person; 





that is, it is at this point in the narrative that a disabled black man becomes a conceptual possibility 
for them. Consider how each of them acknowledges that Robinson is disabled. For Jem—the 
novel’s vehicle for the articulation of ideals of justice, impartiality, and fairness, whose 
exclamation “Scout, look! Reverend, he’s crippled!” (Lee 1960: 248) reminds us of Frantz Fanon’s 
(1952) “Look, a Negro!—the wide-eyed recognition that Robinson is “crippled” paradoxically 
underscores the frustrated justice of the novel’s narrative according to which every person should 
be treated equally. By contrast, for Scout, who states that “If [Robinson] had been whole, he would 
have been a fine specimen of a man” (Lee 1960: 257), the recognition that Robinson is disabled 
renders him flawed, unfortunate, and tragic, de-masculinizes him and compromises his sexual 
desirability and prowess. For Underwood, who appeals to the belief according to which the 
wrongness of Robinson’s eventual killing was prior to, and more fundamental, or intuitive, than 
lofty talk about justice, killing cripples is always wrong, a sin. For Underwood, it seems, 
Robinson’s death is horrible—an act of “senseless slaughter” (Lee 1960: 323)—not simply 
because he committed no crime, but rather, because he committed no crime and he was a cripple. 
Cripples, Underwood wrote in his newspaper editorial, should be regarded like songbirds: like 
songbirds, cripples are poignant, helpless creatures subject to the mercy and benevolence of other, 
more powerful creatures, rather than fully-fledged human beings subject to the values and ideals 
of justice, fairness, and truth. In short, through their apparently distinct remarks, Scout, Jem, and 
Underwood variously reinforce their own identities as not crippled, as not disabled, as “able-
bodied,” in addition to the ways in which they signify Robinson as disabled, that is, as “crippled.” 
Hence, each of these apparently distinct utterances from the characters of Scout, Jem, and 
Underwood serves to reconsolidate and reproduce the apparatus of disability within the context of 
Lee’s narrative and, in particular, reproduce the ideal of able-bodiedness that has emerged from 
within that apparatus of power. 
 
 
Knowing the apparatus of disability, initially 
 
In this essay, I demonstrated how consideration of disability—that is, consideration of the 
apparatus of disability—has been left out of analyses of epistemic justice, in particular, and social 
epistemology, in general. I showed that insofar as feminist and other philosophers have not taken 
disability into account in their analyses of epistemic injustice, they have circumscribed the political 
domain too narrowly, obscuring epistemological resources that they ought to acknowledge. When 
disability is factored into analyses of the epistemic injustice depicted in Lee’s novel To Kill a 
Mockingbird, for instance, more complex understandings of how both the apparatus of disability 
and the white supremacist social imaginary would have shaped dimensions of Lee’s characters 
become available. So long as philosophers of social epistemology continue to exclude 
consideration of the apparatus of disability from their work, the critical scope, political integrity, 
and transformative potential of this work will remain limited. That the ways in which the apparatus 
of disability operates in and through Lee’s narrative have gone unnoticed and unacknowledged 
until now is indicative of the pervasiveness of epistemological ignorance and epistemic injustice 
about disability in both the tradition and contemporary profession of philosophy. My argument, 
therefore, is that in order to expand the hermeneutical resources and epistemic justice of their 
theoretical practice, feminist and other philosophers must no longer neglect to consider the 
apparatus of disability in the analyses of social epistemology that they generate, but rather, must 
incorporate this political phenomenon into these analyses from inception of them.  
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